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Mikell Washington
American University Washington College of Law
Alternative Methods to Regulating Paid Uncredentialed Tax-Return Preparers Post Loving
I.

Introduction

With an increasing number of inconveniences with filing taxes and constant changes to the
already complex Internal Revenue Code, many taxpayers rely on paid tax-return preparers to
assist in filing their taxes.1 In 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter “IRS”) conducted
a study that found approximately 83 million taxpayers paid to have their federal tax return
prepared for the 2017 tax year.2 The majority of these returns were filed by preparers who were
neither licensed nor regulated.3 This statistic is concerning because many taxpayers blindly rely
upon the assistance of paid preparers, despite preparers not being federally regulated, nor

1

Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C.

2013).
2

Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/choosing-a-paid-tax-return-preparer

(last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
3

Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 Tax Notes

767, 769 (2012).
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/NTA_TaxNotes_LovingCase.pdf
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required to demonstrate a certain level of competency in federal tax law. 4 John Koskinen the
IRS Commissioner in 2015, stated “about sixty percent of all tax-return preparers operate
without any type of oversight or education requirement.” 5 As a result of the lack of oversight, tax
preparers incorrectly file returns which have devastating consequences for taxpayers, taxpayers
fall subject to fraud and other predatory practices, and the IRS is unable to collect the full
amount of taxes which they are owed.
Paid preparers are broken into two major categories, uncredentialed and credentialed
preparers. Uncredentialed preparers make up approximately sixty percent of all preparers and
lack any professional licensure or certification. Additionally, they are not regulated nor required
to demonstrate any competency in tax law before charging for services. 6 On the other hand,
credentialed preparers are regulated and do have professional licensures. They include certified
public accountants, attorneys, enrolled agents, and enrolled retirement plan agents.7 Currently,
4

Elaine Povich, The Scary Truth About Your Independent Tax Preparer, HUFFINGTON POST

(Feb. 25, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/25/tax-preparations_n_4853792.html.
5

Internal Revenue Service News Release (2014), New IRS Filing Season Program Unveiled for

Tax Return Preparers: Voluntary Program to Focus on Continuing Education for Unenrolled
Preparers, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/IR-14-075.pdf.
6

Taxpayer Advocate Service, Return Preparer Oversight: The IRS Lacks a Coordinated

Approach to Its Oversight of Return Preparers and Does Not Analyze the Impact of Penalties
Imposed on Preparers (2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018ARC/ARC18_Volume1_MSP_07_RETURNPREPARER.pdf.
7

Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-2 C.B. 192.
2

there is not a nationwide regulation program for uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers, but
New York, Oregon, Maryland, and California have implemented state level regulations. 8 With so
many taxpayers relying on the assistance of paid preparers, majority of whom are uncredentialed,
it is imperative to have government oversight in the form of regulations. Regulations will
increase compliance within our tax system by ensuring uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers
are competent and properly claiming legal positions for taxpayers which they are entitled to.
Furthermore, regulations will assist in protecting taxpayers, especially those who are low-income
because they “are often the least educated and least financially sophisticated in the United
States.” 9
The IRS has made several attempts throughout history to regulate uncredentialed paid taxreturn preparers, the most recent being 2011. In efforts to respond to concerns surrounding
taxpayers “being poorly served due to [tax] preparers’ inadequate education and training,” the
IRS promulgated regulations which required uncredentialed tax-return preparers to: 1) pass a
competency test related to Form 1040 and related schedules, 2) pay annual fees, and 3) complete
continuing education courses. 10 These regulations were rejected before issuance in the landmark
case Loving v. Commissioner. This decision was a major setback for the IRS because it
permanently enjoined the IRS from enforcing a “registration scheme against tax-return

8

Povich, supra note 4.

9

Olson, supra note 3, at 769.

10

Loving, 742 F. 3d at 1014.
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preparers,” and held that the IRS does not possess the statutory authority to regulate
uncredentialed tax-return preparers. 11
This paper argues a nationwide regulation program for uncredentialed tax-return preparers is
needed and the current regulation regime is insufficient. Regulation helps to ensure effective tax
administration, ensure ethical standards of preparers, and to protect low-income taxpayers from
incompetent and unscrupulous preparers. This paper reviews historical attempts by the IRS to
regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers and proposes two viable alternatives to regulation
which will achieve some of the same goals. It provides insight into the landmark case Loving v.
Commissioner which set precedent for regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers. And it
examines current literature both for and against regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers.
Part II, A begins by providing background information of how the IRS exercised their
regulation authority pre- Loving. Part II, B will discuss the promulgated regulations set forth by
the IRS in 2011, which were rejected in Loving. Part II, C lay outs the current regulatory scheme
of uncredentialed tax-return preparers post- Loving. Part III, examines recent literature in favor
and against regulation of uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Part IV, offers a proposal in
accordance with recent literature, asking for a legislative fix by Congress to provide the IRS the
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Additionally, it offers unique
alternatives to regulation, that achieve some of the same goals as regulation, if a legislative fix by
Congress is not adopted.

II.
11

Background

Id. at 1022.
4

A) 1884 - 2011
Originally enacted in 1884, 31 U.S.C. §330 provides the Treasury Secretary with the
authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Treasury
Department.” 12 Since the IRS is a bureau of the Treasury Department, 31 U.S.C. §330 includes
practice before the IRS. 13 The regulations set forth by the Treasury Secretary are reprinted under
the name Treasury Department Circular 230 (hereinafter “Circular 230”). 14 Circular 230 was
created in 1921 and “govern[s] the recognition of attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled
agents . . . . and other persons representing taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service.“15 It
provides the standards of compliance for tax-return preparers who “practice before the IRS” and
offers methods and procedures of discipline for those who fail to comply with those standards. 16
Before the IRS promulgated regulations in 2011, the IRS never maintained the position that
31 U.S.C. §330 or Circular 230 gave them the authority to regulate tax-return preparers. 17

12

31 U.S.C. §330 (2020).

13

26 C.F.R. §601.101(a) (2020).

14

Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71.

15

Id. §330.

16

Pippa Browde, A Consumer Protection Rationale for Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, 101

Marq. L. Rev. 527, 552 (2017).
17

Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1021. (holding, in the first 125 years after the statute's enactment, the

Executive Branch never interpreted the statute to authorize regulation of tax-return preparers.
But in 2011, the IRS decided that the statute in fact did authorize regulation of tax-return
preparers).
5

Rather, they maintained the position that 31 U.S.C. §330 gave them the authority to regulate
credentialed paid tax-return preparers such as attorneys, accountants, and other tax professionals
“appearing in adversarial proceedings before them through competency standards.” 18
B) 2011 - 2014
In 2011, the IRS in response to public concerns of the tax preparation industry, promulgated
regulations which attempted to expand its regulatory authority to uncredentialed tax-return
preparers. 19 The regulations required uncredentialed tax-return preparers to register as a new
category of preparers called Registered Tax-Return Preparers (RTRP). 20 The primary goal of the
RTRP program was to “increase the quality of the tax preparation industry and to improve
services to taxpayers.” 21 Furthermore, the program was believed to “increase tax compliance and
help to ensure that tax-return preparers are knowledgeable, skilled, and ethical.”22 The
regulations required tax-return preparers to: 1) pass a competency test related to Form 1040 and
related schedules, 2) pay annual fees, and 3) complete continuing education courses. 23 In the

18

Id. at 1015.

19

Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32, 286-87

(Jun. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
20

Elaine Smith, Regulating Tax Preparers: Transforming Loving from a Stumbling Block to A

Stepping Stone, 83 UMKC L. Rev 1079, 1090 (2015).
21

Internal Revenue Service Registered Tax Return Preparer Test Explained (2012),

http://irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-11-12.pdf.
22

T.D. 9501, 2010-46, I.R.B. 652.

23

Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1014.
6

promulgation of the regulations, the IRS relied on 31 U.S.C. §330,24 which provides the IRS the
authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the
Treasury." 25 The IRS estimated the promulgated regulations would apply to approximately
600,000 to 700,000 tax-return preparers. 26
Three independent tax-return preparers who would be subject to the regulations, brought suit
against the IRS “seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the new
regulations.” 27 The individuals argued the regulations were beyond the scope of authority given
to the IRS by 31 U.S.C. §330. 28 The District Court for the District of Columbia held in favor of
plaintiffs and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals opined that the IRS’s
interpretation of the statute was “unreasonable in light of the statute's text, history, structure, and
context.” 29 This case established that the IRS does not possess the authority to regulate
uncredentialed tax-return preparers because merely preparing a tax-return does not constitute
practice before the IRS.
C) 2014 - Present

24

Id.

25

Id. § 330(a)(1).

26

Loving, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1014.

27

Id. at 1016.

28

Id. at 1014.

29

Id.
7

Despite the D.C. Court of Appeals decision to reject the proposed regulations in Loving,
some regulations still exist. However, the category of RTRP does not. 30 The most important
remaining regulation is the Preparer Tax Identification Number (“PTIN”). The PTIN, which
derives its statutory authority from Section 6109 (a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, began in
1999 as an “alternative for tax-return preparers furnishing their social security numbers on tax
returns which they prepared.”31 The PTIN was required to help protect the identity of tax-return
preparers and to “help maintain the confidentiality of SSNs.”32 The PTIN is a number assigned
to any individual who for compensation “prepares all, or substantially all, of any federal tax
return or refund claim.”33 It serves as a mechanism by which the IRS can regulate tax-return
preparers by collecting data and easily identifying any preparer misconduct. 34 Furthermore, it
allows the IRS to better identify tax-return preparers, centralize information, and effectively
administer the rules relating to tax-return preparers. 35
The requirements attached to obtaining a PTIN, renewing a PTIN, and failure of having a
PTIN are so de minimis that the need of greater regulations on tax-return preparers is apparent.
30

Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-2 C.B. 192.

31

Steele v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2016).

32

Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 Fed. Reg. 60, 309 (Sept. 30, 2010).

33

Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ptin-requirements-for-tax-

return-preparers (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
34

Internal Revenue Service, Return Preparer Review Pub. No. 4832, Return Preparer Review

(2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4832.pdf.
35

See Furnishing Identifying Number of Tax Return Preparer, 75 Fed. Reg. 60, 309 (Sept. 30,

2010). See also; Montrois v. United States, 916 F. 3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir 2019).
8

To obtain a PTIN, a return preparer can do so by filling an application online called the W-12. 36
There are no prerequisites or filing requirements and the process to complete the W-12 is not
extensive. So much so, that the IRS boasts that the application “only takes about 15 minutes.” 37
Similarly, the renewal process is just as simple. To renew a PTIN, a preparer must pay a nominal
fee of $63 and complete another W-12, which takes the same amount of time. The need of
greater regulations attached to the PTIN is reinforced with the inconsequential fee of $50, a
preparer must pay per return for failure to furnish a PTIN.38 Therefore, any paid tax-return
preparer can easily obtain a PTIN and renew a PTIN, without any legitimate risk associated.
Another form of regulation is the Annual Filing Season Program, an IRS program which
provides paid tax-return preparers who voluntarily enroll into the program continuing education
of tax law. Created in 2015, the program serves as an interim measure to regulate tax-return
preparers by providing them with current updates of federal tax law.39 Furthermore, the program
is designed as an incentive for tax-return preparers to voluntarily join. To complete the program,
an uncredentialed tax-return preparer must compete 18 hours of continuing education, which
consists of a six-hour federal tax law refresher course with a test, ten hours of other federal law
topics, and two hours of ethics. 40 The preparer must also renew their PTIN and “consent to

36

Internal Revenue Service, supra note 35.

37

Id.

38

26 U.S.C.S. § 6695 (2020).

39

Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/annual-filing-season-program

(last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
40

Id.
9

adhere to the obligations in Circular 230, Subpart B and section 10.51.”41 After the preparer has
completed the program, they are awarded a record of completion from the IRS and will have
their name recognized in a public database of return preparers called the Record of Completion
Directory on the IRS website. 42 Additionally, the preparer is given limited representation rights
before Revenue Agents, Taxpayer Advocate Service, customer service representatives, and the
IRS for the returns which they prepared.43
The Annual Filing Season Program is a strong attempt by the IRS to regulate uncredentialed
tax-return preparers and provide taxpayers with assurance that their tax-return preparer’s
competency. However, it is insufficient because the comprehension test’s structure allows
preparers to “game the system.” If a preparer fails the test on their first attempt, the provider
administering the test can provide the preparer with the exact test for their second attempt. 44
Similarly, on a preparer’s third attempt, the test provider can administer a test with as much as
half of the same questions as the second test. 45 The current structure of the test does not ensure
tax preparers are competent in tax law and dampens the IRS’s ability to regulate tax-return
preparers and ensure a certain level of competency. A preparer who fails the test on their first
attempt can simply memorize the answers for their second attempt. Similarly, a preparer who
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ce-provider-faqs-annual-

federal-tax-refresher-aftr-course#act (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
45

Id. (explaining, a minimum of fifty percent of the test questions for the third attempt must be

different than the questions in the prior test).
10

fails on their second attempt, can memorize the answers for their third attempt where they may
come across as much as fifty percent of the same questions. This practice takes away from the
IRS’s ability to ensure preparer possess a certain level of competency because preparers can
study the test and not learn the material.
The awareness of the Annual Filing Season Program needs to be increased. There are no
statistics or empirical evidence at the moment that provides insight into the number of taxpayers
who utilize the RPO Directory when making their selection to hire a preparer. However, it is my
assumption that many taxpayers do not use the directory because they are unaware of it. If
taxpayers were aware of the directory, they would utilize it to make informed decisions while
selecting a tax-return preparer because they would be aware of the amount of tax law knowledge
the preparer possesses. This informed decision will assist in decreasing levels of concern
regarding tax-return preparers incompetency and improve confidence of the tax preparation
industry.
III.

Review of Existing Proposals

A large portion of current literature concerning regulation of the tax preparation industry
calls for government regulation over uncredentialed tax-return preparers. This regulation is
usually in the form of an amendment to 31 U.S.C. §330, which will grant the IRS the ability to
regulate uncredentialed paid tax-return preparers. 46 However, some have made the argument that

46

See Soled and Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 151, 193 (2017).;

See also; (Alex H. Levy, Believing In Life After Loving: IRS Regulation of Tax Preparers, 17
Fla. Tax Rev. 437, 467 (2015)).
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regulation of uncredentialed tax-return preparers would do more harm than good.47 This section
reviews current literature and discusses existing proposals.
A. Levy
In 2014, the year Loving was decided in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Alex
Levy wrote an article examining Loving and discussing its aftermath. The article painted a
picture of the Government’s previous attempts to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers.
Levy, at the time a recent graduate of New York University School of Law, agrees with other
commentators discussed below that mandatory regulations of uncredentialed tax-return preparers
is beneficial, and that a legislative fix by Congress may be necessary to achieve it. In fact, Levy
contends that a legislative fix by Congress is the only pathway left for regulation to be achieved
because of the Solicitor General failed to petition the Supreme Court after Loving.48
Levy contends government oversight is needed to assist in properly allocating public
monies, to decrease incompetence, and to protect low-income taxpayers against fraud and
predatory practices from uncredentialed tax-return preparers. 49 Levy emphasizes the
consequences of these practices do apply to all taxpayers, but are particularly devastating for
low-income taxpayers because they lack the resources to detect fraud by their preparer and are
left “to reimburse the government, plus interest, and may also be barred from claiming a vital tax

47

Bob Ewing, IRS Tax Preparers: A Successful Challenge to the IRS’s Authority To License Tax

Preparers, https://ij.org/case/irs-tax-preparers/#backgrounder (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
48

Id. at 441.

49

Levy, supra note 46, at 448-50.
12

benefit in the future.”50 Levy acknowledges a legislative fix will be difficult to achieve due to the
Loving court’s decision and the current political climate. 51 Nonetheless, Levy encourages the
IRS to no let this dissuade them. 52
In coming to this proposal, Levy recounts the IRS’s six-month public review on the taxreturn preparer industry in 2009, in response to concerns about the industry. 53 During this
review, the IRS solicited comments from individuals, groups, and organizations on how to “1)
increase taxpayer compliance and 2) ensure uniform and high ethical standards of conduct for tax
preparers” known as Notice 2009-60.54 Levy bolstered his claim for government oversight by
revealing that Notice 2009-60 received more than 500 comments, some which rejected the idea
of testing tax-return preparers. But, most which “favored some level of increased regulation.”55
As a result of these solicitations, the IRS in 2011 promulgated regulations requiring tax-return
preparers to 1) pass a competency test, 2) pass a background check, and 3) obtain a PTIN, which
were struck down in Loving. 56

50

Id. at 448.

51

Id. at 469.

52

Id. at 441.

53

Id.

54

Levy, supra note 46, at 442.

55

IRS Return Preparer Review, supra note 34.

56

Levy, supra note 46, at 443.
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Levy also emphasizes his dissatisfaction with the Loving case. Levy argues that the IRS
was outmaneuvered because the IRS’s litigation strategy was “bumbling and ill-considered.” 57
Sarcastically, he questions whether the IRS actually anticipated their regulations to be
challenged. 58 He argues that the IRS should have been more proactive and rejected the court’s
characterization of a tax preparer as a mere scrivener because taxpayers rely on unregulated taxreturn preparers due to the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. 59 Furthermore, they rely on
unregulated tax-return preparers because they are “often low income and vulnerable.”60 As a
result of the Loving failure, Levy argues a simple one sentence inclusion to 31 U.S.C. §330, that
explicitly gives the government the authority to regulate tax- return preparers is necessary. 61
Levy proposes to change the language of the statute from “the Secretary of the Treasury
may—regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the
Treasury,”62 to the “Secretary of Treasury may—regulate the practice of representatives of
persons before the Department of Treasury—including compensated preparers of tax returns,
documents, and other submissions.” 63 Levy highlights that this legislative fix is not foreign,
having received Congressional support in 2013 when Senator Max Baucus of Montana, included

57

Id. at 440.

58

Id. at 444.

59

Id. at 445.

60

Id.

61

Levy, supra note 46, at 467.

62

Id. § 330(a)(1).

63

Levy, supra note 46, at 468.
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a clause in his tax reform discussion draft on tax administration which granted the IRS explicit
authority to regulate tax-return preparers.64
B. Olson
In 2013, when Loving was pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Nina Olson the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), wrote a Special
Report to Tax Notes regarding the need for regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Olson,
who was appointed by the Secretary of Treasury in 2001, dedicated her professional career to
serving taxpayers as an advocate. Before serving as the NTA, Olson was the Executive Director
and founder of the Community Tax Law Project, an organization which provides free tax
assistance to low-income families. 65 Furthermore, Olson testified before the House Ways and
Means Oversight Subcommittee and the Senate Finance Committee in 1997 and 1998, regarding
problems facing low-income taxpayers.66
Olson advocates for the regulation of unenrolled (“uncredentialed”) tax- return
preparers. 67 Olson highlights the preparation industry has become a very lucrative market and
low-income taxpayers have become easy targets of predatory practices. 68 Olson argues
regulation is needed to protect low-income uneducated taxpayers and ensure preparers are
accurately preparing returns and upholding ethical standards. Olson recommends that Congress
64

Id. at 458.

65

The Community Tax Law Project, http://ctlp.org/ (last visited May 2, 2020).

66

Olson, supra note 3, n.4 at 768.

67

Id. at 769.

68

Id.
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adopts her recommendations set forth in her 2002 NTA report, and require uncredentialed taxreturn preparers to register, be tested, and complete continuing legal education.” 69 Olson argues
continuing education and testing are prophylactic because it ensures preparers possess a
minimum level of competency and professionalism to minimize future negligence. 70
Furthermore, Olson stresses regulations would benefit taxpayers and increase the level of public
trust for the tax-preparation industry.71
Olson maintains this argument, despite the Loving court’s holding that the IRS does not
possess the authority to regulate tax-return preparers. Olson argues that the IRS does in fact
possess the authority to regulate tax-return preparers because the court incorrectly characterized
the roles and responsibilities of a tax preparer.72 Olson describes the uniqueness of tax-return
preparation, explaining that preparing a return “is not merely a ministerial act.” 73 Rather, it
signifies that a tax-return preparer is “in the business of advising and assisting [their] client . . . .
on the treatment of her items.”74 Therefore, preparing a tax return is “almost always, presenting a
case” before the IRS because a tax-return preparer “acts as a representative before the IRS when
they advise and assist a taxpayer in making their claim to the IRS and Treasury.”75 Olson
continues her argument to say for the above-reasoning, the District Court’s opinion in Loving
69

Id. at 768.

70

Id. at 777.

71

Olson, supra note 3, at 778.

72

Id. at 769-72.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 767.
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was incorrect because it was based on a “fundamental misrepresentation [of] what occurs in 21st
century tax administration.76
Olson does not explicitly call upon a legislative fix by Congress to provide the IRS with
the authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Rather, she highlights that Congress
in 1884 placed regulations on tax-return preparers in response to concerns of the tax return
industry where are identical to current circumstances. Therefore, Congress’s regulation would be
“permissible and [a] reasonable approach to solving a serious problem in tax administration.”77
C. Browde
In 2017, Pippa Browde an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Montana
wrote an article discussing regulation for uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Browde calls for
regulation of the return preparation industry, but offers a new outlook on how the issue of
regulation ought to be framed. Browde frames the issue of necessity for regulation as a
“consumer protection” issue. One where low-income taxpayers ought to be considered
consumers and the need of regulation is to prevent uncredentialed tax-return preparers from
preparing returns with errors and prevent abusive practices against low-income taxpayers. In
framing the need of regulations as a “consumer protection” matter, Browde focuses on lowincome taxpayer and fails to address the need of regulation to further compliance with the United
States’ tax system and decrease the tax gap.78 Furthermore, Browde challenges the concept that
regulations on tax-return preparers would invite compliance.
76

Olson, supra note 3, at 772.

77

Id. at 777.

78

Browde, supra note 16, at 556.
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Browde explains how the role of a tax-return preparer from the perspective of a lowincome taxpayer creates a strong level of dependency because low-income taxpayers primarily
rely on paid preparers to assist in the preparation and filing of their tax returns. 79 She offers
multiple rationales for this dependency including, that low-income taxpayers believe they lack
the ability to prepare their return themselves and believe that “using a paid preparer may increase
the amount of refund they will receive or accelerate their refund.”80 With the existence of this
relationship, Browde explains taxpayers trust that their preparers are competent.”81
Browde continues to discuss the dependency between taxpayers and paid tax-return
preparers by illustrating how paid tax-return preparers have a “unique role in the tax
administration system . . . to help low-income taxpayers access social welfare benefits
administered through the tax system.” 82 In this assertion, Browde focuses on the history and the
importance of the Earned Income Tax Credit (hereinafter “EITC”) to low-income taxpayers. She
explains that the EITC represents “the nation’s largest anti-poverty program and the private
industry acts as intermediary to assist taxpayers (low-income) claim their eligibility.”83 Due to
the financial importance the EITC has on low-income taxpayers, Browde argues that “the
majority of taxpayers claiming EITC benefits rely on the services of tax return preparers.”84 As a

79

Id. at 533.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 538.

83

Browde, supra note 16, at 538.

84

Id. at 539.
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result, Browde alleges this invites fraud.85 Furthermore, Browde argues this reliance from lowincome taxpayers on paid tax-return preparers creates a high error rate.
D. Jay Soled and Kathleen Delaney Thomas
Jay Soled and Kathleen Delaney Thomas, tax professors at prominent U.S. law schools,
desire Congress’s intervention within the tax-return preparation industry just like Olson, Levy,
and Browde. They argue Congress should regulate the actions of uncredentialed tax-return
preparers because they “lack expertise in tax law and target low-income taxpayers.”86
Furthermore, uncredentialed tax-return preparers, “often charge exorbitant and hidden fees while
frequently making errors, which, if detected by the IRS, leave[s] the taxpayer responsible for
repayment of taxes and interest. 87 Soled and Thomas emphasizes the importance of regulation to
protect all taxpayers, especially low-income taxpayers.
Soled and Thomas begin their proposals by articulating the importance of the taxpreparation industry and the taxation process within the United States. They argue for the private
sector, the goal of the tax-preparation industry is to generate profit. 88 While, the goal of the IRS
is to collect money which will be used to reduce poverty and redistribute wealth.89 They
acknowledge that these two goals are at odds with one another, but the IRS’s goal should prevail.
85

Id. (arguing, tax returns claiming the EITC are perhaps the single biggest source of fraudulent

refund claims).
86

Soled and Thomas supra note 46, at 154.

87

Id. at 154.

88

Id.

89

Id.
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Additionally, they argue by regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers with competency
standards, the government can ensure a decrease in the tax gap, promote social welfare
programs, and minimize tax-return errors. 90
To achieve these goals, Soled and Thomas propose a legislative fix by Congress which
would extend Circular 230’s regulations to apply to all tax return preparers. 91 Soled and Thomas
argue Congress can easily achieve this goal by merely adding two sentences to 31 U.S.C. §330. 92
Soled and Thomas do not provide the specific language change for the proposed legislative fix.
However, they do offer that one sentence would declare that practice before the Treasury
Department includes tax-return preparation and the other sentence would “declare that in the
process of tax-return preparation, tax return preparers act as taxpayers’ de facto
representatives.” 93 This in effect, “will allow the Treasury Department to require all tax-return
preparers, credentialed or uncredentialed to 1) pass a competency exam, 2) undertake continuing
tax education courses, and 3) submit a separate, signed statement acknowledging their
involvement in the process.” 94 Furthermore, it will allow the Treasury Department to sanction
those tax-return preparers who fail to uphold certain moral decency standards.95
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Soled and Thomas’s article does not address the current regulation through the PTIN.
Additionally, as a regulatory alternative the article uniquely proposes that the Treasury
Department could redesign the Form 1040 in a manner that would potentially help ensure better
tax compliance. 96 However, they do not provide guidance of how this will be accomplished, but
they do admit that this alternative is not feasible without properly addressing the competency
standard of tax-return preparers.97
Soled and Thomas add that an expansion of Circular 230 to encompass all tax return
preparers, will allow the IRS to secure injunctions against a tax-return preparer’s ability to
practice more easily, enhance financial liability exposure against a preparer who commits errors,
and strengthen criminal tax sanctions.” 98 Soled and Thomas explain that proposing regulations
has two perspectives, one of the taxpayer and the other from the tax-return preparer. Soled and
Thomas argue from the taxpayer’s perspective, there should be a decrease or limit on penalties
for taxpayers who owe the IRS due to an error made by a tax-return preparer. 99 Furthermore,
they recommend that taxpayers be further involved in the tax-return preparation process by
mandating all taxpayers to “supply their tax-return preparers with a signed-one-page declaration
consisting of four parts.100 The parts “affirming: i) the importance of taxpayer honesty; ii) the
advantages associated with the submission of a correct return, iii) the disadvantages associated
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with the submission of an incorrect return, and iv) gratitude expressed by the government for
taxpayers fulfilling their civic duties.101
E. Arguments Against Regulation
Some literature argues that government oversight in the form of regulations is not necessary
because regulation only benefits large tax-return preparation companies such as H & R Block
and Jackson Hewitt. 102 The Institute for Justice (hereinafter “Institute”), the organization who
represented Sabina Loving in the landmark Loving case, has adopted this viewpoint. The
Institute argues that the powerful industry insiders would be the main beneficiaries of regulating
uncredentialed tax-return preparers, at the expense of independent preparers, because they
lobbied for the regulations and it would help them to “limit competition and drive more business
their way.”103 This argument follows the idea that mandatory regulations would drive small
business tax-return preparers who are unable to afford the expenses associated with mandatory
regulations out of business, and benefit the larger tax-return preparation companies who are able
to afford the regulation expenses. Additionally, The Institute argues mandatory regulations are
not sincere, rather a "power grab” attempt by the Obama IRS. 104
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Another argument against regulation is that even if the IRS was provided with the statutory
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers by Congress, the IRS would be unable
to effectively do so because they lack sufficient resources and competency. 105 The IRS similar to
other government agencies have a limited budget. The budget varies from year to year and
results in various cancellations of agency initiatives and even hiring freezes. In the current
regulation regime, the IRS’s limited budget has resulted in them only being “able to audit a tiny
percentage of returns each year.” 106 Thus, IRS resources are scarce. Mandatory regulations to be
effective would require an increase of IRS resources which the IRS does not possess. For
example, for the IRS to achieve the regulations set forth in Loving, they would need an increase
in budget to hire personnel to review background checks and ensure all preparers have completed
their continuing education requirements. Therefore, regulation is not necessary because the IRS
does not have sufficient resources to effectively regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers.
IV.

Proposal
In accordance with the above literature, a legislative fix by Congress is needed to regulate

uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Regulation is needed as a mechanism to ensure compliance
within the U.S. tax system and efficient tax administration. Furthermore, regulation is needed to
protect low-income taxpayers from predatory practices of incompetent uncredentialed preparers.
The proposals set forth within this section echo current literature requesting Congress to make a
legislative fix which will give the IRS the authority to regulate uncredentialed paid tax-return
preparers. In addition, this section offers two viable alternatives of regulation which will be
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beneficial if Congress refuses to make a legislative fix. It is important to draw a distinction
between the terms regulation and alternatives. Regulations are mandatory and will be forced
upon all tax-return preparers who for compensation prepare tax returns. However, this concept
was rejected in Loving, therefore, the alternatives that I speak of will be voluntary and will only
apply to those uncredentialed preparers who choose to opt into the program.
The preferable proposal to achieve regulation for uncredentialed tax-return preparers is a
legislative fix by Congress to 31 U.S.C. §330. A legislative fix is simple and can be achieved in a
sentence or two. The sentence will provide clear language which explicitly grants Congress the
authority to regulate uncredentialed tax-return preparers. The language can be changed from “the
Secretary of the Treasury may regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the
Department of the Treasury” to, the Secretary of Treasury may—regulate the practice of
representatives of persons before the Department of Treasury “including any individual who is
compensated for preparing tax returns, documents, and other submissions.”
1. Possible alternatives outside of the Loving regulations
Even if an amendment to 31 U.S.C. §330 is rejected by Congress or Congress fails to act,
viable alternatives to regulation exists that will achieve the same goals. These alternatives are
cost-effective and will provide incentives to uncredentialed tax-return preparers who chose to opt
in.
The Annual Filing Season Program discussed in section II, can serve as an alternative to
regulating uncredentialed tax-return preparers if the critiques discussed are resolved. The
program currently is voluntary and provides uncredentialed tax-return preparers who choose to
opt into the program, public recognition of competency through a directory which they can show
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their clients. However, many taxpayers are unaware of the program and the program’s testing
structure needs to be changed. If taxpayers were aware of the program and knew that the
preparers listed on the directory contained a certain level of competency in federal tax law,
taxpayers would feel more confident in hiring preparers because they would be able to view their
credentials. Additionally, if the competency test administered was structured in a way that a
preparer could not simply memorize the test, both taxpayers and the IRS can be assured that the
returns prepared by uncredentialed tax-return preparers were accurate and contained minimal
errors, if any.
These critiques can be easily remedied to serve as an alternative. To change the structure
of the comprehension test, the Annual Filing Seasons Program can simply adopt the same testing
curriculum as volunteer programs, such as VITA or TCE which will be discussed in the next
section. The new testing curriculum will allow uncredentialed preparers to demonstrate
competency in tax law and ensure competency depending on the type of tax law they desire to
pursue. To raise awareness of the program, the IRS can simply advertise the program and its
benefits on their website, billboards, and other relatively cheap platforms. The benefits received
by any uncredentialed tax-return preparer who voluntarily opts in the Annual Filing Season
Program would be that they are provided with clients who need to have their returns prepared but
are outside the eligibility scope of volunteer programs. Furthermore, they will be provided with
taxpayers who have contacted the IRS for assistance or whom the IRS have previously issued
deficiencies, as a result of an incorrectly filed return or a preparer’s error.
Another viable alternative to regulation is connecting taxpayers with preparers who
complete the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program (VITA), Tax Counseling for the Elderly
(TCE), or a similar volunteer program with training and a competency test. VITA is a federally
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funded program by the Treasury Department and provides free tax-return preparation services to
all individuals including those with disabilities, whose income is $56,000 or less.107 Similarly,
TCE is a federally funded program and offers “free tax help to individuals sixty or older.”108 For
both programs, a potential taxpayer who is outside the scope of eligibility is declined assistance
and left to locate a tax-return preparer who is able to file their return. I propose that these turnedaway taxpayers are provided with the names of the tax-return preparers who have successfully
completed the program. Furthermore, these taxpayers names should be placed on a list which any
tax preparer who has successfully completed the program could access and contact the taxpayer.
To become a VITA volunteer, identical to become a TCE volunteer, an individual must
complete a series of in-person course trainings on federal tax law and pass a competency test.
The test varies in difficulty depending on the level of preparation an individual desires (i.e. basic,
advanced, military, health savings, international, foreign student and scholars)109 and the
individual must receive a minimum score of eighty percent to pass. 110 After completion of the
trainings and the competency test, the individual is certified as a preparer and permitted to
prepare returns. They are assumed to possess sufficient knowledge to accurately prepare taxreturns based upon the level of which they pursued.
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The alternatives will achieve some of the same goals that regulation would, but without
mandating that all uncredentialed tax-return preparers opt into the program. Additionally, the
alternatives will benefit individual or small business uncredentialed tax-return preparers. Small
shop tax preparers (“mom and pop shops”) who opt into these programs would not fear losing
money or being beat out of competition by the bigger tax preparation industries as a result of
opting into these programs. In fact, they may be able to compete with the larger corporate
preparation competition because they would receive referrals of clients who are outside of the
eligibility scope of the VITA program and would have their name published in the Record of
Completion Directory. These incentives will serve as a sufficient incentive for uncredentialed
tax-return preparers to pay the expenses associated with the alternative program.
V.

Conclusion

Uncredentialed tax-return preparers are the majority of tax-return preparers and are not
required to demonstrate any level of competency in tax law nor any knowledge at all. They are
simply required to fill out a form online and obtain a PTIN which takes merely a few minutes.
But, if they make a mistake on a taxpayer’s return, those consequences to the taxpayer can be
devastating. This seems highly inequitable. Additionally, volunteers in programs such as VITA
or TCE are required to take trainings on tax law and competency tests, but paid preparers are not.
It seems illogical to have trainings for volunteer preparers, but not paid preparers.
The Internal Revenue Code is complex and changes periodically which causes taxpayers to
blindly rely upon paid tax-return preparers. Taxpayers assume their hired preparer is competent
and will prepare their return honestly and without errors. But, this is not always the case and
there is not a sufficient regulation regime that currently exists to enforce this. Statutory penalties
are insufficient to induce fear and to prevent preparers from committing fraud and other
27

predatory practices. Therefore oversight is needed. It can be in the form of a simple legislative
fix within 31 U.S.C. §330 by Congress. But, if Congress fails to act or rejects such a fix,
alternatives in the form of the Annual Filing Season Program or the VITA/TCE program is
viable. These programs will meet the two major goals of the RTRP program which was to
“increase the quality of the tax preparation industry and to improve services to taxpayers.” 111
Uncredentialed tax-return preparers who are now competent in tax law will increase the quality
of the tax preparation industry by preparing tax-returns with less errors which will help the IRS
with their collection efforts. Additionally, competence will assist uncredentialed tax-return
preparers in demonstrating to both their referred and non-referred clients that they contain a
sufficient amount of knowledge which will improve services to taxpayers.
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